



“Why Should I Read This Book?” and other questions I have been asked about

The Indispensable Man:

*George Washington Rains, the Confederate Powder Works,
and the Civil War You Never Knew*, by Theodore P. Savas

(November 2026)

www.savasbeatie.com



Q1: I have a lot of books on the Civil War and many I have not yet read. Why is this book important and why should I read it?

A1: Because most of the books you’ve read that cover many of the key topics of interest found inside *The Indispensable Man* are based on a regurgitation of the same handful of sources saying the same basic things over and over, with little or no real original research or critical, outside-the-box thinking.

I spent nearly four decades digging through primary and archival source material most historians have never seen or utilized in any meaningful way. That is not intended as a disparagement because there was no real reason for them to look for it and, in truth, I stumbled upon much of it. I firmly believe this new research fundamentally alters how we must approach the study of the first year of the Civil War in terms of strategy and logistics. What I’ve been taught and what was available to read, and what you’ve been taught and what you have read, are often wrong and, without a doubt, very incomplete. I bring the receipts to prove it.



The Indispensable Man demonstrates without equivocation that one of the main pillars of the Jefferson Davis administration's grand strategy at the war's outset has never been recognized or even discussed. I set all this out in depth. Simultaneously, the Lincoln administration knew precisely what the Davis administration was up to and was warned about it during the early weeks of the war by the *New York Times* and many other sources. The United States could have ended the war within weeks, or at worst a few months, whether it won a single battle or not. This is not hyperbole. I prove it with documented sources and numbers. Math does not lie. Instead, the Lincoln administration planned for and waged a strategy that absolutely guaranteed a long and bloody war.

This is but one or two of a dozen reasons why this book is important, and why, as a student of the war, you should read it.


Q2: Every Civil War book says the Confederacy was chronically short of everything from day one. But the South still managed to fight for four years. So obviously the Rebels had enough of what they needed to wage a long war.

A2: The actual shape of that statement or argument is that "if the South had enough of what it needed, it could fight a long war; the South fought a long war; therefore, it must have had enough of what it needed." That's the classic fallacy of affirming the consequent. It's invalid because plenty of other paths could produce the same four-year outcome without the premise being true. It's a logic trap, and nearly every reader and historian falls into it.


I like to call this reverse-engineered thinking: start at the known outcome and assume the means to get there existed the whole time. They didn't. The how, why, where, when, and what that made the four years of war possible form a significant slice of this book. By every objective standard and based upon what the major players knew at the time, not in hindsight, this war should have been over in the fall of 1861.

Q3: *I've read scores of books on the war, and I have never heard of George Washington Rains. To me, he feels like a bit player and not a man who deserves a long biography. If he mattered as much as you claim, why isn't he well known?*

A3: Because his decision to avoid a field commission and take on a monumentally important task behind the scenes relegated him to the shadows of history. He knew it, too, and it bothered him until the end of his life. And yet if it wasn't for him and his accomplishments, you would never have heard of Stonewall Jackson or Ulysses S. Grant, and Robert E. Lee and almost all the other names that roll off the tongue easily today would barely warrant coverage in a footnote, because there would be nothing remotely similar to the war we know today.



The sources on Rains are fairly ample, but they are widely scattered and not readily available. I say this having spent thirty-eight years chasing him and them down. The man has been actively neglected. Here's a quick bio: the native North Carolinian graduated 3rd in the West Point class of 1842, alongside James Longstreet, William Rosecrans, Abner Doubleday, D. H. Hill, and A. P. Stewart. He had a distinguished and impactful role during the Mexican War (his diary is the best of its kind in existence and has never been used). He married into one of the richest families in America, moved to upstate New York, and became a wealthy part-owner of a thriving Hudson Valley ironworks. He was secretly recruited by the Davis administration during the early weeks of the war. He left it all when his home state seceded. Davis selected him to organize, build, and run the only major permanent government industrial complex the Confederacy completed during the entire war: the Augusta Powder Works. Without that accomplishment (and many others that until now have never been put into writing), the Confederacy could not have waged a long war.



And yet he almost never appears in the secondary literature, and when he does, he is often confused with his brother Gabriel (the inventor of the landmines and water torpedoes). Most historians who write about the Georgia campaigns and even Sherman and his March to the Sea not only don't mention the presence of


the Augusta Powder Works, but don't even mention Rains by name! No one had bothered to assemble the full record of the man and his accomplishments. Until now. When I tell you Rains stood at the hub of nearly everything of consequence, I am not exaggerating.

Q4: *The Indispensable Man strikes me as a book about a gunpowder factory run by a guy I have never heard of. No offense, but it sounds boring. I love reading about battles and strategy and tactics and generalship.*

A4: So do I. And that's a lot of what this is, just with a different twist. Let me explain.

After reading my full manuscript, John Coski, the former historian for the Museum of the Confederacy, described this book as "nothing less than a complete history of the strategy of the Civil War told through the prism of Confederate powder-making."


Gunpowder is the excuse to watch a genuinely brilliant officer and manager operate under total scarcity, with the fate of his new nation riding on his success or failure. Rains had to build an industrial complex from scratch, in wartime, with nothing we would recognize today as a supply chain, using chemistry and engineering knowledge that barely existed, while keeping the trust of subordinates and superiors alike, innovating constantly, and never missing a deadline that mattered. All of this is playing out against the unfolding war in every theater, which runs parallel with the entire narrative.



He built a talent stack over decades before the Confederacy handed him a problem that would have broken most men. If you want to see resource-scarcity leadership and adaptive management under existential pressure, inextricably linked to the strategy of the war and the armies playing it all out in the field, this is that book. The Civil War setting is the container. The lessons are timeless. And you will never look at the war the same way again.

Q5: *In 2007, you helped write Never for Want of Powder about the Augusta Powder Works and Rains. What is the difference between this new book and the older book?*

A5: *Never for Want of Powder*, the organizational brainchild of Chip Bragg, focused on the Augusta Powder Works itself, the original architectural blueprints I discovered hidden away in an Augusta museum, and the daily powder mill records in the National Archives I began mining nearly four decades ago. It is an interdisciplinary study. Rains, while very important, of course, is not the central thesis of that work.



The Indispensable Man is a full biography of Rains, from birth to death, with the centerpiece being the Civil War and his Herculean task to build and manage the two-mile powder mill complex and a dozen other responsibilities. Think of *Never for Want of Powder* as more of a vertical study of the powder mill, while *The Indispensable Man*, itself deep and thorough, is much broader and all-encompassing. They are two very different books, and they complement each other rather than compete with one another.

Q6: *This is a footnote-heavy academic study, and a long one. Will this be a chore to get through?*

A6: I hope not! I was very cognizant of that when I was putting all the pieces together.

I did my best to write a lively, colorful, easy-to-read main narrative that I hope will be engaging and something of a page-turner. That said, there are about 1,250 footnotes. Some are a few words; others take up half the page. If you keep your eyes on the main narrative, you'll still get a lot out of the book, and it will be a faster read. The footnotes, however, are also written in a rather lively style, and they flesh out a lot of very important information and side stories you have never seen anywhere else that impact the main event. I highly recommend readers take their time and really immerse themselves in the book because it's like stepping into another world and discovering that what you thought was there is something else entirely.

Rains's journey was rather epic and unlike any I have ever read about. His was a very personal and long sad road to get back home—if you'll forgive me the comparison, something akin to Odysseus's trials to reach his destination. Rains's final Will asked that his body be wrapped in the Augusta Arsenal's flag and buried at the foot of the Augusta obelisk chimney. That's not a "footnote." That's the last line of a Shakespearean play. The powder works are the engine of the story. The man is the story. If you read this book, you will never forget him. He will never leave you.


Q7: *Many history books make claims about being groundbreaking or rewriting this or that. What's actually verifiable here versus your interpretation?*

A7: Many books can be "groundbreaking" on some relatively isolated event (like a battle or a series of decisions) without rewriting or changing our fundamental view of the war itself. This is not that book.


I was well on the way to finishing the biography when digital keyword searches began uncovering reports, telegrams, letters, diaries, et al., all focused on the same keyword: gunpowder. Each on its own bore no obvious relation to the others. Think of them as individual splotches of color—blue there, a tad of green,

some red and yellow. The human mind is pretty good at picking up patterns, however, and once I found literally dozens of data points I had never seen before, all saying the same basic thing and from all over the Confederacy, the pattern emerged.

I took a couple of steps backward, metaphorically, and realized that the bits of color comprised a giant painting I didn't even know existed. Then it was all clear. These were statements of fact at the time, in forts, camps, depots, arsenals, aboard warships, and in the halls of Richmond, and they were all specifically saying the same thing. They had been hiding in plain sight. There's no interpretation there.



The hard facts that undergird these complaints, concerns, reports, factual statements, allegations, et al., are all documented and checkable. They are verifiable, not interpretation or guessing. The role of the Augusta Powder Works (and the Augusta Arsenal) is exceedingly well documented, both with its own internal daily reporting and in newspapers, the reports of spies, generals, other field officers, and, of course, Rains himself, who wrote about it extensively. None of that is my opinion; it's the archival record, and a good deal of it was corroborated independently at the time by a host of sources. All of this is in the footnotes.




What is mine is the argument that connects those documented facts into a strategic through-line—a “complete history of the strategy of the Civil War told through the prism of Confederate powder-making,” to use Dr. Coski’s description—that no one had ever assembled. Don’t take any of my claims on faith; the notes are there for others to check my work. I show you the receipts and let you follow the math to its logical conclusions.

Q8: *If you're right, doesn't that mean generations of Civil War historians got the war's first year (and maybe the last year, too) fundamentally wrong?*

A8: I think I've actually described it that way, but a better description would be incomplete rather than wrong—and for an understandable reason. Most historians who study general or early-war strategy aren't also ordnance or gunpowder specialists, so they don't have a reason to notice how close to total collapse the Confederacy's ability to fight actually was in 1861.

The evidence for it is scattered across arsenal letter books, compiled service records of second- or third-tier officers, citizen pay files, diaries, unpublished memoranda, newspapers (try searching them on microfilm, which was all you could do up until a handful of years ago), and buried inside 140,000 pages of the Official Records, accessible via a rather byzantine indexing system. They also had no reason to know all the nuances of military-grade gunpowder, its uses in various weapons, or how difficult it was to make it at scale. If you don't understand this, then everything that's come before isn't flat-out wrong; it's just incomplete. But it's such a giant piece of the puzzle that explains so much that it feels as if what has come before is wrong.



The Indispensable Man doesn't throw out what came before. It supplies the missing piece that ties everything together—throughout the war, not just during its first year or its final months. Prior historians didn't know it was missing.

Q9: *Every discipline—archaeology, paleontology, history—has stories of respected experts closing ranks against new evidence instead of engaging with it. Some of what you have uncovered and how you interpret it is going to ruffle some feathers, so to speak. Will your book get a fair hearing or a reflexive dismissal?*

A9: I'd be more worried if a negative reaction didn't happen! That might mean no one is reading my book!

It is a natural human reaction to cross your arms and push back when something new comes along challenging the orthodoxy. That's not a flaw in how these fields work — it's the normal cost of challenging a framework that careers, textbooks, and reputations were built on top of. Historians who've spent years offering a traditional explanation of the course of the war have a real stake in that reading holding up. I understand that.

My job isn't to win an argument, but to follow the evidence wherever it leads. Unlike many writers, I didn't begin with a thesis and then look for source material to support my preconceived belief system. I just set out to write a biography on an interesting man. I had no idea just how interesting he really was, and the

advent of modern technology during the final years of my work uncovered evidence that had been basically invisible to everyone previously.

I will say I have had two very different responses, one on each side of that fence. In 2024, I reached out to two or three leading historians to share with them some of the rather shocking information I was discovering. One, whose name I won't reveal, expressed some doubt but told me he would be happy to read that particular chapter. He called me the next day and admitted he was both surprised and embarrassed that he had never seen or heard any of this before. And then he asked to read the entire manuscript. He finished in about a month, offered some outstanding observations and corrections, and declared that it was very unique and an entirely new take on the war.

Another historian I admire applauded the research, offered some valuable corrections, but rather reflexively defaulted to well-established traditional arguments that ran completely contrary to the hard evidence I had just presented to him, and that he had just praised. I can only attribute it to some form of cognitive dissonance. He did not push back on the quality of the research, or how it was specifically interpreted here or there, or why this or that source was unreliable. He just brushed it aside and made the same sweeping general assumptions from fifty years ago. But that's what he had been taught, and that's what he had read, and that's what he had written about, so it was deeply engrained within him. That's human nature. I get it.

Q10: During one of your talks online, you ask, “What did the Lincoln administration know and when did it know it?” You hint at this also in your Introduction, which I read on the website. Given how widespread this specific information was when the Civil War began, the manner in which the North conducted the war is baffling. How do you account for that?

A10: I don't, and I can't. I'm a big fan of Abraham Lincoln, so the facts that I uncovered regarding what the administration knew before the war began and during its early months raise a host of deep and serious questions that remain unanswered as to why it planned and conducted the war as it did. I didn't have years to deeply investigate that question, and it was tangential to my main storyline. The research I did perform in that regard did not offer a satisfactory answer.

The questions are profound and have not only military but also political, and perhaps even sociological, implications. (I also have an entire appendix on the fact that the United States left the Augusta Powder Works standing and never during its three years of existence did they try to destroy it. I think I know why.) My sincere hope is that other historians will take up this line of inquiry because I think it's a rich and important one to follow.

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